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Rooting opinions in the minds: a cognitive model and a
formal account of opinions and their dynamics
Francesca Giardini 1, Walter Quattrociocchi 2 and Rosaria Conte 3
Abstract. The study of opinions, their formation and change, is
one of the defining topics addressed by social psychology, but in re-
cent years other disciplines, like computer science and complexity,
have tried to deal with this issue. Despite the flourishing of different
models and theories in both fields, several key questions still remain
unanswered. The understanding of how opinions change and the way
they are affected by social influence are challenging issues requiring
a thorough analysis of opinion per se but also of the way in which
they travel between agents’ minds and are modulated by these ex-
changes. To account for the two-faceted nature of opinions, which
are mental entities undergoing complex social processes, we outline
a preliminary model in which a cognitive theory of opinions is put
forward and it is paired with a formal description of them and of their
spreading among minds. Furthermore, investigating social influence
also implies the necessity to account for the way in which people
change their minds, as a consequence of interacting with other peo-
ple, and the need to explain the higher or lower persistence of such
changes.
1 Introduction
The studies about opinions, persuasion and social influence are foun-
dational and pressing issues in social psychology; however, within
this discipline, the dynamics of opinions at the level of population
has been underestimated. There are also other disciplines that have
shown a great interest regarding such an issue, ranging from political
science ([17]) passing through socio-physics ([7]) up to complexity
science ([18]). Understanding opinions, describing how they are gen-
erated and revised, and how fare opinions travel over the social space
both as a consequence of social influence and as one of the main
means through which social influence unfolds, is crucial for grasp-
ing a deeper understanding of human social cognition and behaviors.
Investigating opinions requires to take into account two levels of
explanation: the individual and the social level. Social psychology
has been mainly interested in explaining this first level, trying to de-
scribe the complex interplay of affective, cognitive and behavioral
aspects that make opinions emerge. On the other hand, scholars from
computer science and physics have tried to explain how different
opinions can coexist or how they are modified through social inter-
actions, treating opinions as objects that are exchanged and revised
according to certain mechanisms that are quite far from the reality
of cognitive and social processes. In both cases there is a reduction-
ist fallacy that works in apparently different ways but it affects both
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these approaches, leading them to treat opinions either as a set of
unrelated specific elements or as a unidimensional object that has
nothing in common with a cognitive representation.
We claim that opinions are highly dynamical representations re-
sulting from the interplay of different mental representations and af-
fected by the mental states of other individuals in the same network.
Aim of this work is to provide an interdisciplinary account to de-
scribe how social influence leads to opinion formation, evolution and
change. Moving from a characterization of opinions as mental repre-
sentations with specific features, we will try to model how opinions
are generated within the agents’ minds (micro-level) and how they
spread within a network of agents (macro-level). When explaining
the emergence of macro-social phenomena we need to know what
happens at the micro-level, i.e. what drives human actions and deci-
sions in order to understand how individuals’ representations and be-
haviors can give rise to socially complex phenomena and how those
affect agents’ actions. Without explaining how opinions are formed
and manipulated within the individuals’ minds, it is very difficult to
account for the way in which they change as an effect of social in-
fluence. Our aim is to understand whether and how heterogeneous
agents, endowed with different beliefs and goals, may come to share
a given viewpoint and what consequences this sharing has on agents’
behaviors. We are interested in providing answers, at least partially,
to the following questions: What is an opinion? What mechanisms
lead people to change their opinions? How can individuals resist to
changes? What are the mechanisms of influence acting within and
between individual minds? How does social impact affect agents’
elaboration of new or contrasting information?
As opinion is still a debated concept within several disciplines,
either its conceptualization or formalization are hard tasks. In partic-
ular, the actual instruments -e.g. metrics, formalisms does not allow
for a tight definition accounting for a) the relationships between opin-
ions and other epistemic representations and b) their dynamics both
at social and individual level. In this paper we approach a preliminary
formal definition of opinions by means of Time Varying Graphs [8]-
e.g. a new formalism aimed at characterizing dynamically evolving
systems as shown in [23, 22].
In section 2, a brief review of the state of the art is provided to in-
troduce the main theories of opinions developed in the field of social
psychology and to discuss more recent advances in opinion dynam-
ics. Section 3 is devoted to the description of our model, in which a
definition of opinions as specific mental representations and cogni-
tively founded hypotheses about their diffusion and change will be
put forward. In section 4 a preliminary formal account of how opin-
ions are generated and how they can change is provided. In section 5
some conclusions are drawn and future directions are suggested.
2 State of the Art
Social psychologists have devoted much attention to the study of
opinions’ formation and spreading, but a comprehensive and defi-
nite model allowing for an operational and generative account is still
missing. Providing a comprehensive review of social psychology lit-
erature is beyond the scope of this work, but in this section we will
discuss some of the main theories in order to underline how partial is
the picture of opinions emerging from these studies.
In general, opinions are treated as synonyms for different men-
tal objects, as beliefs [20], or more frequently, attitudes. Opinions
are often conceptualized as attitudes [19], [15], [21] or they are used
as interchangeable terms that have in common the fact of being af-
fected by social influence and persuasion [25]. Allport [3] recog-
nizes the difference between attitudes and opinions but he nonethe-
less considers the measurement of opinions as one way of identify-
ing the strength and value of personal attitudes. An alternative view
contrasts the affective content of attitudes with the more cognitive
quality of opinions that involve some kind of conscious judgements
[12]. Crespi [9] considers individual opinions as ”judgemental out-
comes of an individual’s transactions with the surrounding world”
(p.19), emphasizing the interplay between what he calls an attitudi-
nal system and the external world characterized by the presence of
other agents and different subjective perceptions. Opinions are the
outcomes of a judging process but this does not mean that they are
necessarily rational or reasoned, although Crespi recognizes that they
need to be consistent with the individual’s beliefs, values and affec-
tive states. As other authors already pointed out [1], many models
of opinion and social influence do not provide careful definitions of
what an opinion is and how it is affected by social influence. This
happens to be true also for theories of persuasion, like the social im-
pact theory [16], a static theory of how social processes operate at the
level of the individual at a given point in time. Part of this theory has
been developed usign computational modeling by Nowak, Szamrej
and Latan [2]. In their model, individuals change their attitudes as a
consequence of other individuals’ influence. In parallel with the idea
that social influence is proportional to a multiplicative function of the
strength, immediacy, and number of sources in a social force field
[16], [13] suggest that each attitude within a cognitive structure is
jointly determined by the strength, immediacy, and number of linked
attitudes as individuals seek harmony, balance, or consistency among
them. Although very interesting, this account fails to distinguish be-
tween attitudes and beliefs and does not explain how inconsistencies
can be resolved. The effect of communication on opinion formation
has been addressed by different disciplines from within the social and
the computational sciences, as well as complex systems science (for
a review on attitude change models, see [1]). One of the first works
on this topic has focused on polarization, i.e. the concentration of
opinions by means of interaction, as one main effect of the ”social
influence” [11], whereas the Social Impact Theory’ [2] proposes a
more dynamic account, in which the amount of influence depends on
the distance, number, and strength (i.e., persuasiveness) of influence
sources. As stated in ([7]), an important variable, poorly controlled
in current studies, is structure topology. Interactions are invariably
assumed as either all-to-all or based on a spatial regular location (lat-
tice), while more realistic scenarios are ignored.
Turning our attention to complex systems science, one of the most
popular model applied to the aggregation of opinions is the bounded
confidence model, presented in [10]. Much like previous studies, in
this work agents exchanging information are modeled as likely to ad-
just their opinions only if the preceding and the received information
are close enough to each other. Such aspect is modeled by introduc-
ing a real number ǫ, which stands for tolerance or uncertainty ([7])
such that an agent with opinion x interacts only with agents whose
opinions is in the interval ]x− ǫ, x+ ǫ[.
The model we present in this paper extends the bounded confi-
dence model by providing a cognitively plausible definition of opin-
ion as mental representations and identifying their constitutive ele-
ments and their relationships.
2.1 Main Advances
This work aims at outlining a non-reductionist cognitive model of
opinions and their dynamics. Differently from the models reviewed
above, we first provide a definition of opinions as mental representa-
tions presenting specific features that make their revision and updat-
ing more or less easy and enduring. Moreover, grounding opinions in
the minds allow us to take into account not only direct processes of
revision triggered by the comparison with others’ different opinions,
i.e. social influence, but also revisions based upon changing in other
mental representations supporting that opinion.
The computational model introduced in this paper is intended to
provide a preliminary unifying framework to define opinions and to
characterize their dynamics in an easy but non-reductionist approach.
Opinions in several models of opinion dynamics are considered to
change according to social influence, we try to outline what is social
influence and the way the social network structure affects the agents’
opinions.
3 A Cognitive Theory of Opinions
Opinions can be described as configurations of an individual’s be-
liefs, values and feelings that can be conditionally activated. This
means that, for instance, starting from my feeling of aversion toward
mathematics and as a consequence of having met a rude friend of
friends who happened to teach math at school, when asked about
my opinion on the time kids should spend in studying mathemat-
ics, I can form or, better, activate an opinion according to which the
less time they spend the better it is. Opinions stem from the condi-
tional activation of different kinds of mental representations, that can
have a propositional content or, as in the case of attitudes and feel-
ings, they can be more evaluative. However, there is a specific feature
that distinguishes an opinion from other kinds of mental objects. An
opinion is an epistemic representation, thus it is a belief in which
the truth-value is deemed to be uncertain. Opinions refer to objects
of the external world that can not be told to be either true or false.
This impossibility to say whether the content of a representation is
true or false is what makes a mental representation an opinion, as
opposed to a piece of knowledge, for instance. This basic feature can
be paired with the presence of an attitude, i.e. an evaluative compo-
nent that specifies whether the individual likes or dislikes the topic.
In general, attitudes are present when the topic is somehow involving
for the subject, so he is positively or negatively inclined toward it.
When this is not the case, we have ”factual opinions”, like in the
following example. If someone is required to say when Mozart died,
he can know the correct answer or not, but this is not a moot point.
On the contrary, the causes of Mozart’s death are debatable because
without knowing where he was buried it is impossible to analyze the
bones and to ascertain what killed him. This means that we know
that Mozart died in 1791 but there are contrasting opinions about the
causes of his death, and, even if there exist one true opinion, none
can tell which is the truth. On the other hand, when opinions involve
also evaluative components or facts, the opinions result from the ac-
tivation of a pattern of related representations like knowledge, other
opinions, but also goals. This view allows us to describe opinions
as non-static patterns of relationships in which different representa-
tions are linked through a variety of different linkages. This work is
meant to address the origin and changing of opinions thanks to these
inter-relationships.
An opinion is characterized by the three following features. First,
the truth value can not be verified (or it is not relevant). In general,
opinions are representations whose truth value can not be assessed
through direct experience. The topic of the opinion can not be ex-
perienced and then it is impossible to say whether a given object is
true or false. If I ask someone about his opinion on the military inter-
vention in Afghanistan, he can not tell me that his opinion, whether
positive or negative, is true, because it is not possible to test an al-
ternative state of the world in which the intervention has not taken
place and then asses which state was the best. Nonetheless, he can
tell me that he has a strong opinion or that he is very confident in it
because he has many supporting beliefs (e.g. Talibans’ regime had
to be fighted, civilians needed the intervention, the world is a safer
place after the intervention, etc) and even some goals (for instance,
feeling safer) related with that opinion. This is to say that the lack of
an assessable truth value is totally independent from the confidence
one has in his opinions. We can have strong or weak opinions, but
our confidence does not depend on the fact that something is known
to be true, given the impossibility to assess its truth-value.
The second feature is the degree of confidence which is a subjec-
tive measure of the strength of belief and it expresses the exent to
which one’s opinion is resistant to change. The degree of confidence
depends on the number of supporting representations, and the higher
this number the stronger an opinion will be. Castelfranchi, Poggi [6]
made a distinction between confidence coming from the source and
confidence coming from the degree of compatibility that a given be-
lief has with pre-existing beliefs. It is interesting to notice that rep-
resentations do not need to be about the same topic or to belong to
the same set to form a coherent network. If we take the Afghanistan
example, we can easily imagine that a negative opinion about the
military intervention could be supported by a general belief about
the right of other countries to intervene in internal disputes or by
negative evaluations about the US foreign policy, or even by knowl-
edge about the roles played by URSS and US in Afghanistan during
the Cold War. These beliefs are not exclusively related to the target
opinion and they can have stronger or weaker connections with other
opinions. The stronger the confidence in these beliefs and the higher
their number, the stronger will be the confidence in that opinion.
Finally, the sharing of an opinion, i.e. the extent to which a given
opinion is considered shared, is another crucial feature. The sharing
may heavily affect the degree of confidence, making people feel more
confident because many other individuals have the same opinion. The
sharing is the outcome of a process of social influence, through which
agents’ opinion are circulated within the social space and they can
become more or less shared. This dimension is crucial, but it is also
true that it carachterize other social beliefs, like reputation.
It is worth noticing that there are other kinds of beliefs that are
really close to opinions but, at a closer investigation, there are some
important differences. Reputation can be one of these, because it is
shared and it is also carachterized by a varying degree of confidence.
But, unlikely opinions, reputation has a truth value because it refers
to someone’s behaviors or actions that were actually exhibited (or
that were reported as such, but we do not want to address here the
issue of lying) and reported to other people. Reality matters in rep-
utation, whereas it is much less relevant in opinions, as witnessed
also by the fact that reputation does not have to be convincing (i.e.
supported by some reasoning or arguments), whereas opinions have.
4 Toward a Formal Definition
4.1 Preliminaries
4.1.1 Time Varying Graphs
The temporal aspects of our opinion model is based on Time-Varying
Graphs (TVG) formalism, a generic mathematical framework [8] de-
signed to deal with the temporal dimension of networked data and
to express their dynamics from an interaction-centric point of view
[26].
Consider a set of entities V (or nodes), a set of relationsE between
these entities (edges), and an alphabet L accounting for any property
such that a relation could have (label); that is, E ⊆ V × V × L. L
can contain multi-valued elements.
The relations (interactions) among entities are assumed to take
place over a time dimension (continuos or discrete) T the lifetime
of the system which is generally a subset of N (discrete-time sys-
tems) or R (continuous-time systems). The dynamics of the system
can subsequently be described by a time-varying graph, or TVG,
G = (V,E, T , ρ, ζ), where
• ρ : E × T → {0, 1}, called presence function, indicates whether
a given edge or node is available at a given time.
• ζ : E×T → T, called latency function, indicates the time it takes
to cross a given edge if starting at a given date (the latency of an
edge could vary in time).
4.1.2 The underlying graph
Given a TVG G = (V,E, T , ρ, ζ), the graph G = (V,E) is called
underlying graph of G. This static graph should be seen as a sort
of footprint of G, which flattens the time dimension and indicates
only the pairs of nodes that have relations at some time in a given
time interval T . In most studies and applications, G is assumed to be
connected; in general, this is not necessarily the case. Note that the
connectivity of G = (V,E) does not imply that G is connected at a
given time instant; in fact, G could be disconnected at all times. The
lack of relationship, with regards to connectivity, between G and its
footprint G is even stronger: the fact that G = (V, E) is connected
does not even imply that G is “connected over time”.
4.1.3 Edge-centric evolution
From an edge point of view (relationships within epistemic repre-
sentations), the evolution derives from variations of the availabil-
ity. TVG defines the available dates of an edge e, noted I(e),
as the union of all dates at which the edge is available, that is,
I(e) = {t ∈ T : ρ(e, t) = 1}. Given a multi-interval of avail-
ability I(e) = {[t1, t2)∪ [t3, t4)...}, the sequence of dates t1, t3, ...
is called appearance dates of e, noted App(e), and the sequence of
dates t2, t4, ... is called disappearance dates of e, noted Dis(e). Fi-
nally, the sequence t1, t2, t3, ... is called characteristic dates of e,
noted ST (e).
4.1.4 Graph-centric evolution
From a global standpoint, the evolution of the system can be derived
by a sequence of (static) graphs SG = G1, G2.. where every Gi
corresponds to a static snapshot of G such that e ∈ EGi ⇐⇒
ρ[ti,ti+1)(e) = 1, with two possible meanings for the tis: either
the sequence of tis is a discretization of time (for example ti = i);
or it corresponds to the set of particular dates when topological
events occur in the graph, in which case this sequence is equal to
sort(∪{ST (e) : e ∈ E}). In the latter case, the sequence is called
characteristic dates of G, and noted ST (G).
4.2 Modeling Epistemic Representations
An opinion is an epistemic representation of a state of the world with
respect to a given object p. It is defined on a three dimensional space
defined by: a) the objective truth value To, a subjective truth value,
namely Ts and a degree of confidence dc with respect to the object p.
More formally we can state that:
Definition 1 an epistemic representation of a state of the world m ∈
M is a quadruplet p, To, Ts, dc defined by a preposition p related to
a given object O, and two variable To and Ts defined on R. The dc ∈
R respectively quantifying the “real“ truth value of an information,
namely the objective truth value, the perceived truth values, and the
degree of confidence, with respect to the preposition p.
By varying the dimensions of the domain of To and Ts, we can
define a taxonomy of the epistemic representation of the world that
can be summarised as follows:
Definition 2 An epistemic representation mk = {p, To, Ts, dc} is
knowledge when To = Ts.
Definition 3 An epistemic representation mb = {p, To, Ts, dc} is a
belief when 0 < To < 1 ∧ 0 ≤ Ts ≤ 1 .
Definition 4 An epistemic representation mo = {p, To, Ts, dc} is
an opinion when 0 ≤ To < 1 ∧ 0 ≤ Ts ≤ 1.
4.3 Opinions and Individuals
We can define an epistemic representation graph as a network of epis-
temic representation immerged in a dynamic network in a given time
interval and the links state the correlation among them. Let us con-
sider a set V of mental representation (or nodes), interacting with
one another over time. Each relation among the mental representa-
tion can be formalized by a quadruplet c = {u, v, t1, t2}, where
u and v are the involved mental representations (either beliefs, or
knowledge or an opinion), t1 is the time at which the correlation oc-
curs, and t2 the time at which the relation terminates. A given pair of
nodes can naturally be subject to several such interactions over time
(and for generality, we allow these interactions to overlap). Given a
time interval T = [ta, tb) ⊆ T (where ta and tb may be either two
dates, or one date and one infinity, or both infinities), the set C(T )
(or simply C) of all interactions occurring during that time interval
defines a set of intermittently-available edges E(T ) ⊆ V × V , such
that:
∀u, v ∈ V, (u, v) ∈ E(T )
⇐⇒ ∃t′ ∈ [ta, tb), (u, v, t1, t2) ∈ C(T ) : t1 ≤ t
′
< t2
(1)
that is, an edge (u, v) exists iff at least one interaction between u and
v occurs, or terminates, between ta and tb. The intermittent avail-
ability of an edge e = (u, v) ∈ E(T ) is described by the presence
function ρ : E(T )× T → {0, 1} such that ∀t ∈ T , e ∈ E(T ):
ρ(e, t) = 1 ⇐⇒ ∃(u, v, t1, t2) ∈ C : t1 ≤ t < t2 (2)
The triplet G = (V,E, ρ) is called an epistemic representation
graph, and the temporal domain T = [ta, tb) of the function ρ, is
the lifetime of G. We denote by G[t,t′) the mental representation sub-
graph of G covering the period [ta, tb) ∩ [t, t′)
Hence, a sequence of couples J = {(e1, t1), (e2, t2), ...}, with
ei ∈ E and ti ∈ T for all i, is called a journey in G iff {e1, e2, ...} is
a walk in G and for all i, ρ(ei, ti) = 1 and ti+1 ≥ ti. Journeys can
be thought of as paths over time from a source node to a destination
node (if the journey is finite).
Let us denote by J ∗G the set of all possible journeys in an epistemic
representation system G. We will say that G admits a journey from a
node u to a node v, and note ∃J(u,v) ∈ J ∗G , if there exists at least
one possible journey from u to v in G.
4.4 Opinion Dynamics and Society
One of the most famous formalisms aimed at describing the process
of persuasion is the “Bounded Confidence Model” (BCM) where
agents exchanging information are modeled as likely to adjust their
opinions only if the preceding and the received information are close
enough to each other. Such an aspect is modeled by introducing a
real number ǫ , which stands for tolerance or uncertainty such that an
agent with opinion x interacts only with agents whose opinions is in
the interval ]x ǫ , x + ǫ [. Neverthless the wide, massive and cross-
disciplinary use of the BCM ([18, 14]) ranging from “viral market-
ing” to to the Italians’ opinions distortion played by controlled mass
media ([24, 4, 5, 14]). Such a model does not provide an explanation
of the phenomena yielding to the tolerance value, it is just assumed
as a static value.
In this work we will outline which are the factors affecting the ac-
ceptance or the refuse of one another opinion. In particular, how can
we formalize comparison of two or more opinions? Recalling that
a mental representation is a preposition with the truth value defined
by two variable To, Ts ∈ R and dc ∈ R respectively quantifying
the “real” and the perceived truth value and the degree of confidence
with respect to a given object or proposition. And considering that
such mental representations are modeled as set of time connected
entities of the form G = (V,E, ρ) we can now provide some defini-
tions aimed at describing the process of persuasion.
Assuming that an epistemic representation system, which is by na-
ture adaptive, when facing with external events, reacts to the stimulus
by activating only a subset of its components. For instance, consider
the example where an agent x is questioned by an agent y about his
opinion on a given target.
What does happen in the x’s mental representation system? How
can we quantify x’s attitudes to change or not is opinions regarding
a given matter of fact?
According to our model the epistemic representation system of x,
as reaction to the external stimulus posed by the y’s question, will
perform journey within the elements that in its mind are related
with the target of the question and on this base will be able to com-
pare its opinion with the one owned by y.
Definition 5 (relational-)connected component induced by an exter-
nal event in Gx is defined as a set of nodes V ′ ⊆ V such that
∀u, v ∈ V ′,∃J(u,v) ∈ J
∗
G . Then G is said connected if it is itself
a connected component (V ′ = V ).
Since all nodes in V ′ are defined by an objective truth value T and
a degree of confidence (perceived truth value) dg it is obvious that
the resistence to an opinion to change is denoted by these values in
all the nodes in V ′.
5 Conclusions
In this preliminary work we tried to sketch a cognitively grounded
dynamic model of opinions, in which we defined these mental repre-
sentations as carachterized by the presence of three specific features.
Differently than psychological theories of opinions that usually pro-
vide rich definitions that are too complex to be reduced to measurable
variables, we isolated three main constitutive elements that charac-
terize this kind of mental representations. On the other hand, we tried
to overcome the reductionist approach of opinion dynamic models,
in which the richness of human cognitive processes is substituted by
easy-to-compute factors poorly related to actual human behaviors.
For this reason, we proposed to apply time-varying-graph to develop
a formal model able to account for the way in which opinions are
generated and change as a function of the presence and opinions of
other agents in the network.
We are perfectly aware of the complexity of this issue and this
work represents a preliminary attempt to merge the cognitive com-
plexity of opinions with a rigorous formal approach, but there are
many problems that we need to address. First, the cognitive model
should be refined and specific hypotheses about opinion revision and
diffusion should be put forward. Moreover, the robustness of the for-
mal model will be tested and such a model will be implemented in
cognitive multi-agent system in order to explore the parameter space
upon which our model has been defined. Our ultimate aim is to build
up a simulation environment in which agents endowed with heteroge-
neous representations of the external world interact and this leads to
the creation of new opinions, the disappearing of some of the previ-
ous ones and, in general, to different distributions of representations
in the population.
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